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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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11 AUG 1971

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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

11 AUGUST 1971  
(VOL. XXII, NO. 32)

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 2 - 8 AUGUST 1971

Moscow (2744 items)

Sudan	(15%)	8%
China	(5%)	6%
[Sino-U.S.	(3%)	3%]
Relations		
CEMA Council	(5%)	6%
Session		
Indochina	(9%)	5%
Tsedenbal in USSR	(--)	3%
Salyut & Lunakhod I	(4%)	4%
Middle East	(1%)	2%
Apollo 15	(--)	1%

Peking (1358 items)

Domestic Issues	(33%)	30%
[PLA Anniversary	(16%)	11%]
Indochina	(15%)	15%
[PEOPLE'S DAILY	(--)	4%]
Commentator on		
Sihanouk Message		
China UN Seat	(0.1%)	6%
Algerian Foreign	(2%)	5%
Minister in PRC		
PRC-Turkey Diplomatic	(--)	5%
Relations		
PEOPLE'S DAILY	(--)	4%
Commentator on South		
Korea		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

Perhaps because of Vietnamese communist sensitivity on the issue of Sino-U.S. relations, Hanoi and PRG media have maintained an unusual week-long silence on President Nixon's 11 August press conference in which he spoke about his planned trip to China as well as about Vietnam. Continued reassertions of the DRV's resolve to decide its own future and attacks on the President's "schemes" seem indicative of Hanoi's unabated concern about Sino-U.S. developments. The warning that the United States is trying to "sow discord among socialist countries" appears currently in a 6 August NHAN DAN article marking the anniversary of the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan.

Moscow commentators continue to charge the United States with procrastinating on a reply to the PRG's 1 July peace plan and reiterate the line that the President's projected Peking trip aids these dilatory tactics. A highly authoritative article by Georgiy Arbatov in the 10 August PRAVDA complains that the announcement of the President's PRC visit has created the "illusion" in some U.S. circles that the Vietnam question can be settled behind the backs of the Vietnamese; Arbatov also says the timing of the invitation did "obvious damage" to the Vietnamese patriots' struggle.

Sihanouk's current mission to Pyongyang seems to have served Peking's purpose of reassuring its ally regarding the impact of President Nixon's visit to the PRC. At a rally for Sihanouk on the 6th, Kim Il-song hailed the planned visit as "a great victory" of the Chinese people and the world revolutionary forces and observed that the PRC Government has made clear its intention to continue to support the revolutionary people. NCNA carried the text of Kim's speech, which Li Hsien-nien on the 9th called "an important speech."

Continuing Chinese elite-level support for the PRG's peace proposal was voiced by Li Hsien-nien on the 9th in welcoming a DPRK economic delegation. Li also included an endorsement of Sihanouk's five-point declaration and the Pathet Lao's five-point proposal while again calling for an immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from all of Indochina totally and unconditionally.

### ANNIVERSARY DOCUMENTS STRESS DRV INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY

North Vietnam's concern to emphasize its independent line in the wake of the announcement of the President's planned visit to Peking

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is currently manifest in party documents released in preparation for the anniversary of the August Revolution (19 August) and DRV National Day (2 September). The slogans for the two anniversaries, publicized on 5 August, are in most respects similar to those released last year. But in the third slogan, calling for perseverance and stepped-up resistance to achieve complete victory, last year's reference to overcoming hardships is replaced by an appeal stressing independence: "Let us uphold the spirit of independence and sovereignty, rely mainly on ourselves . . . ."

This theme was given more prominence in the party Secretariat's circular for the anniversaries, issued on the 4th and publicized by Hanoi the next day. In a definition of three "main tasks," the circular includes a strong reaffirmation of independence along with routine exhortations to strengthen economic and defense forces and to carry out duties in combat and labor. The circular proclaims that "our party's revolutionary, independent, sovereign line is the most important cause for all the achievements of our people" and adds pointedly: "Our people must determine their own future." It goes on to claim that the combatants and people, "unanimous and united behind our party, thoroughly understand the correct, creative, independent, and sovereign line and are determined to lead our people's revolutionary cause to new successes."

#### DRV SCORES U.S. ACTS SINCE TONKIN EPISODE, PROFESSES OPTIMISM

The anniversary of the August 1964 Tonkin Gulf incident is marked, as usual, with editorials and other comment scoring U.S. actions in Indochina. The 5 August NHAN DAN editorial, like other propaganda, cites the Pentagon papers to substantiate charges that the United States planned the incident. Turning to the present, the editorial denounces the Nixon Administration as "much more reactionary and insidious than its predecessors" and echoes earlier Hanoi comment which seemed to reflect Hanoi's displeasure over Sino-U.S. contacts. It charges that "extremely cunning and wicked, the Nixon clique is seeking a thousand and one ways to extricate itself from its impasse." The Administration, it adds, is "pulling wires, devising schemes, and bragging about peace in the hope of covering up its scheme to prolong and expand the war" and to ward off the demand of public opinion "that it respond to the seven-point PRG proposal, withdraw U.S. troops, and stop supporting the Thieu administration."

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The 5 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the Tonkin anniversary is most notable for its optimistic claim that the worst part of the struggle is over. Although Hanoi propaganda normally avoids any suggestion that sacrifices required of the people may be reduced, the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial says flatly that "the fiercest ordeals" have been overcome and that "the most difficult stage of the revolution is over." It cautions that there will be more "obstacles," but it states that "we have a firm and steady base and fundamental advantages for achieving the final goal."

Seeming to anticipate a new stage in the war, the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial comments that as a result of "victories of strategic significance" in North and South Vietnam, the "resistance struggle is opening a new prospect for our people." Later it claims that the "victories" in southern Laos, on Highway 9, and in Cambodia during the first half of 1971 "have proven that both the position and strength of the revolutionary people of the Indochinese countries are on the verge of a new development." The editorial concludes with a call for the armed forces and people to "overcome hardships and difficulties" and score "glorious feats of arms" to "panic the enemy," along with an avowal of the determination of the army and people to "completely defeat" the allies.

#### MOSCOW AGAIN SAYS NIXON TRIP HELPS U.S. AVOID REPLY TO PRG

Moscow presses the line that President Nixon's projected trip to Peking is helping the United States to put off a response to the PRG's peace initiative and will not serve the cause of ending the war. Brief Moscow radio reports of President Nixon's 4 August press conference say he "acknowledged" that the U.S. Government is being criticized for failing to answer the PRG proposal and note that he "refused" to say when the United States would reply. The reports do not, however, acknowledge the President's remark that the United States is pursuing negotiations "in established channels." Where in response to a question the President said he would not speculate about the effect of his trip on the Vietnam war but that he did not expect the Peking visit to bring an immediate detente, the radio accounts as well as a PRAVDA international review on the 8th represent him as saying his talks with the Chinese leaders "would not mean the immediate end of the Vietnam war."

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Moscow's reports predictably fail to mention the exchange at the press conference on an Asian conference on Vietnam and the speculation by a newsman that the PRC may favor such a forum. But LITERARY GAZETTE on 4 August, in a roundup of the foreign press, cites the London ECONOMIST for a report that Australian opposition leader Whitlam said Chou En-lai told him China is willing to participate in a new Geneva-type conference on Indochina provided it dispensed with the Soviet-British cochairmanship and took on a more Asian character. The same paper cites other Western press sources as suggesting that the PRC may help the President end the Vietnam war and that the North Vietnamese are afraid a Sino-American agreement may be reached behind their backs.

**ARBATOV ON VIETNAM** Georgiy Arbatov's lengthy, authoritative examination of the possible impact of the President's planned Peking visit on U.S.-Soviet relations\* includes the observation that many people in America hope Peking will help the United States end the Vietnam war on terms "suitable to the American bourgeoisie"--a hope reinforced, Arbatov says, by the announcement of the visit in a period when a deep "political rift" has developed in American public opinion on the issue of the war.

With the PRG's 1 July peace initiative charting "a clear road to peace" and prompting the American public to increase its pressure on the Administration, Arbatov says, the announcement of the President's decision to go to Peking was used to deflect attention from the PRG proposal and to build up the "illusion" that it would be possible to settle the Vietnam question over the heads of the Vietnamese people. Commenting briefly on the PRC's position on Vietnam, he said the timing of the invitation to the President could not but inflict "obvious damage" on the Vietnamese patriots' struggle. As for Peking's motives in "easing" the President's situation, he quoted the New York POST as saying that this is a problem for "China experts and Maoists."

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\* See the Soviet-U.S. Relations section of this TRENDS for a general discussion of the article.

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## DRV, PRG PRESS FOR U.S. WITHDRAWAL, END TO SUPPORT FOR GVN

Vietnamese media sustain their publicity for reports of worldwide support for the PRG's 1 July proposal and devote no current commentaries to the proposal or the Paris talks. The proposal is endorsed in a joint DRV-Algerian communique released on the 9th, following the 1-6 August Hanoi visit of a delegation headed by Foreign Minister Bouteflika. The communique accuses the Administration of blocking progress at Paris and of "seeking ways and means to force the Vietnamese people to accept its terms." It reaffirms Vietnamese determination in the face of "these outbursts of violence" and "perfidious political maneuvers."

VNA's account of the 5 August session of the Paris talks indicates that the communist delegates again pressed the seven-point PRG proposal but does not report their references to specific parts of the proposal's first two points, including the conditions for separate cease-fires with U.S. and GVN forces. VNA also ignores DRV delegate Xuan Thuy's attack on the U.S. proposal for a cease-fire.

VNA says Thuy supported the PRG's "correct, fair, and reasonable" peace plan and "laid bare the Nixon Administration's dilatory attitude in refusing to respond" to it--an attitude which "reveals Nixon's real intention of prolonging the war." He emphasized, according to VNA, that the Paris talks "could not make progress so long as the Nixon Administration refuses to respond" to the seven points. The account says the PRG's Mme. Binh recalled the "essence" of the seven-point program and "refuted all tortuous allegations of the Nixon Administration aimed at delaying the negotiations." She stressed that "the so-called will for exploration of all capabilities for peaceful negotiations of the Nixon Administration is sheer hypocrisy" and that "the first thing to be made clear" is whether the Administration is really interested in ending the war.

In keeping with her practice in recent weeks, Mme. Binh again scored the Thieu administration and the United States in connection with the forthcoming elections in South Vietnam. The VNA account includes her charge that the United States and its "puppets" have "resorted to every fraudulent maneuver to prepare for the forthcoming elections and have repressed at will all those who oppose these maneuvers."

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Vietnamese communist media still have not reported Ambassador Bruce's resignation as head of the American delegation, and VNA's account of the 5 August Paris session neglects to mention that deputy head Philip Habib represented the United States. Brushing off the U.S. and GVN statements in a single sentence, it says only that "at today's session, the U.S. Saigon puppets' representatives again rehashed their threadbare allegations and gave no serious response to the seven-point peace program of the PRG."

**DENIAL OF DRV  
PRISONER RELEASE**

VNA's account of the Paris session atypically reports remarks by Xuan Thuy prior to the session to refute speculation about a pending DRV release of more than 180 American prisoners, prompted by a story in a Swedish newspaper citing Scandinavian airline officials. Thuy stated, according to VNA, that early on the morning of 5 August he had heard news from "unknown sources that in the very near future a great number of American prisoners will be released from Hanoi and carried by some kind of aircraft." He remarked that the person who "spread this news was very imaginative indeed," and he added that point one of the 1 July PRG proposal deals with the practical way for the Nixon Administration to obtain the release of its prisoners.

**FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN SCORES U.S. BOMBING OF DRV**

Protests issued by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 7 and 10 August denounced alleged U.S. actions against the demilitarized zone and North Vietnam. Treatment by the media of the actions protested on the 7th was routine, but the incident protested by the spokesman on the 10th, in which U.S. jets allegedly attacked a commune in Vinh Linh on 8 August, has been given atypical propaganda attention.\* The alleged attack was first denounced in a VNA report on the 9th, and the official protest on the 10th was supplemented, according to the VNA press review, by comment in both QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and NHAN DAN.

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\* The U.S. Command in Saigon announced on 9 August that a "protective reaction" strike was made the previous day six miles north of the DMZ against antiaircraft guns that had fired on an unarmed U.S. reconnaissance plane and two fighter-bomber escorts.

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The 10 August foreign ministry spokesman's statement charged that the United States on the 8th "sent its aircraft and launched artillery attacks from positions south of the DMZ to bomb and shell Vinh Chap commune, Vinh Linh area, belonging to the territory of the DRV." It claimed that "this mad act of war by the U.S. imperialists inflicted heavy damage upon the local people," but it used routine language in demanding an end to U.S. "acts of war" against the DRV and to encroachments on DRV sovereignty and security.

The VNA report of 9 August was more graphic than the spokesman's protest. Charging that three U.S. F-4 jets "madly raided" the commune, it says "the U.S. air pirates unleashed eight CBU's and numerous delayed-action as well as instantaneous-action steel pellet bombs, destroying three dwelling houses, a tractor, and many crop fields and causing other losses to the local population." It went on to score other alleged U.S. actions against the DRV which the foreign ministry protest did not mention, asserting that U.S. B-52's bombed Huong Lap commune from 5 to 8 August while U.S. artillery "based on warships and south of the Ben Hai demarcation river bombarded Vinh Quang, Vinh Giang, and Vinh Son communes, all lying in the northern part of the DMZ."

The 7 August protest charged that on the 5th U.S. aircraft bombed Huong Lap village and shelled Vinh Son and Vinh Giang villages with artillery from south of the demilitarized zone. It stated that the villages are in the demilitarized zone, north of the 17th parallel. The protest also said that on the same day U.S. aircraft "on several occasions strafed a number of localities in Bo Trach district, Quang Binh Province."

#### NLHS ENVOY LEAVES VIENTIANE AFTER EXCHANGE BETWEEN PRINCES

Prince Souvanna Phouma's proposal, in a letter to Souphanouvong dated 22 July, for meetings of plenipotentiaries to be held alternately in Vientiane and in a neutralized area within a 30-kilometer radius--"and perhaps a little more"--of the Plain of Jars airfield is denounced in a letter from Souphanouvong on 4 August and in a statement from the "office" of the NLHS Central Committee on the 7th. The central committee statement also announces that Souphanouvong's special envoy, Tiao Souk

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Vongsak, left Vientiane for Sam Neua to report.\* The Pathet Lao response is couched in relatively restrained terms, however, and there is no indication that contacts between the princes will be discontinued.

Souphanouvong's current message is similar to his letter of 11 July which attacked Souvanna Phouma's 5 July proposal for a cease-fire in the Plain of Jars.\*\* The message says the latest proposal is merely a restatement of the previous one and a "trick" to avoid acceptance of the 22 June NLHS proposal for a cease-fire throughout the whole territory of Laos. Souvanna Phouma's proposal, Souphanouvong adds, is aimed at covering up the military operations of the U.S. imperialists and their "lackeys" in the Plain of Jars-Xiang Khouang area and in southern Laos. He concludes by warning that the Americans and their "flunkies" will be held responsible for "all serious consequences" of their actions and that Souvanna Phouma will "equally share" that responsibility. Souphanouvong's 11 July message had said Souvanna Phouma was "also heavily" responsible for the actions for which the United States and the "ultrareactionaries" were "fully" responsible.

The statement of the "office" of the NLHS Central Committee denounces Souvanna Phouma's proposal in similar terms, although it attributes only "heavy responsibility" for consequences of aggression to the Prince and asserts that he made his proposal under U.S. "pressure." It concludes that the NLHS "unswervingly perseveres" in its stand for a peaceful settlement in Laos but will not tolerate any U.S. "sabotage" and will deal punishing blows to all enemy military adventures. The NLHS position is echoed in a statement issued by a spokesman of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces Alliance Committee on the same day.

None of the official statements refers to Souvanna Phouma's allusion, in his latest letter, to Souphanouvong's 11 July assertion that it is possible to order a cease-fire as was done in 1961. Souvanna said the current situation in Laos is unlike that of 1961 and is further complicated by the fact that "certain states" have interfered in Lao affairs and by the relationship of the Lao situation to the Vietnam war. However, a 4 August Pathet Lao radio commentary did score Souvanna Phouma's "excuses" to the effect that the current situation is not propitious for a cease-fire like that of 1961; it also complained that he tried to conceal U.S. aggression in Laos by charging "somebody else" with being the aggressor.

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\* The envoy had returned to Vientiane from Sam Neua on 8 May after an absence of more than three months.

\*\* See the 14 July TRENDS, pages 8-9, for a discussion of this earlier exchange.

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## COMMENTARIES ON GVN ELECTIONS RAISE SPECTER OF KY COUP

Nguyen Cao Ky's failure to qualify as a presidential candidate is cited by Hanoi and Liberation Front media as further proof of the "fraudulent" nature of the impending South Vietnamese elections and of President Thieu's allegedly heavy-handed efforts to insure his own reelection. Little attention has been given to Thieu's only opponent, Duong Van Minh, although some reports note indications that he is considering withdrawing from the race.

A 7 August NHAN DAN article and other comment stress Ky's anger at his failure to qualify and present what they describe as evidence that he will not give in without a further struggle. The article portrays Ky as "a powerful man who once headed a clique of unruly, hard-headed generals," and it speculates that he will not let Thieu "bully" him. Among other things, it says an opinion poll within the ranks of the ARVN has indicated that 60 percent are against Thieu; it quotes Ky as remarking after his candidacy was rejected that "no one knows how the army will react." In the same vein, a 10 August Liberation Radio commentary predicts more directly that "Ky will surely stage a bitter showdown" and adds--in an allusion to the exploits of a literary hero--that "it is not difficult for Ky to achieve something, because Ky not only has sabres but also iron horses and iron birds."

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## SOVIET-U. S. RELATIONS

## ARBATOV EXAMINES IMPACT OF PEKING TRIP ON U.S.-SOVIET TIES

Moscow has given new force to its expressions of concern over President Nixon's projected visit to Peking in a lengthy, authoritative article in the 10 August PRAVDA by Georgiy Arbatov, identified in the paper as director of the USA Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.\* Entitled "Questions Calling for a Practical Answer," the article in effect cautions the United States against engaging in any diplomatic maneuvering in Peking at Moscow's expense which could undermine the confidence necessary for the negotiation of sensitive issues in U.S.-Soviet relations. It also in effect calls on the United States to demonstrate that the visit is not based on anti-Sovietism by taking "a more constructive" approach toward major international issues. Arbatov thus goes beyond the initial Soviet reaction in the I. Aleksandrov article in PRAVDA on 25 July by elaborating on the implications of the projected Peking summit for the ongoing U.S.-Soviet negotiations. The article is notable for its reasoned presentation and moderate tone, its argument against any simplistic approach to the planned visit--possibly addressed to Soviet hardliners--and its advocacy of a wait-and-see attitude.

Arbatov's article appears against the background of the recently concluded Crimea summit, minus Ceausescu, which apparently discussed a coordinated Soviet bloc line on the Peking trip. An indication of the importance Moscow attaches to the article is the fact that TASS carried it in full in its international services.

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\* Arbatov is also a member of the CPSU Central Committee's auditing commission. His writings in the past have appeared to reflect relatively moderate views on U.S.-Soviet relations. Most recently, he argued in the 4 May 1971 PRAVDA for U.S.-Soviet detente on the basis of political realities and pragmatic mutual interests.

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In passages apparently designed mainly for communist consumption, Arbatov begins by rejecting any "simple" approach to the Peking visit that automatically ascribes it to anti-Soviet motives. While acknowledging the standard line that the shift in U.S. policy toward China has gone hand in hand with Peking's hostility toward the USSR, he adds: "But one cannot deduce that all Americans who come out for improving relations between the United States and China are motivated by aims hostile to other socialist countries." He comments that "progressive circles in the United States and some liberals have for a long time been coming out against the cold war course, demanding an improvement of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, including the PRC." And he goes on to trace the shift in U.S. policy toward China to equally pragmatic considerations--to American public opinion influenced "not by Peking's loud words but by its deeds." Peking's "deeds convinced the Americans that China does not represent a real threat to the United States, and therefore one can do business with it."

Also linking the President's acceptance of Peking's invitation to domestic politics, Arbatov says that "evidently the upcoming U.S. elections played a big role" in influencing the decision on the trip, since the Administration "is particularly interested in actions which would help to insure victory for the Republican party." He cites as an additional factor in Administration thinking the hope that Peking might be able to help end the Vietnam war, and in this context he seeks to exploit Chinese vulnerability by charging that the invitation to the President has eased the pressure on Washington to respond to the Vietnamese communist peace proposal of 1 July. But Arbatov declines to elaborate on the possible long-term effects the Peking-Washington talks might have on Hanoi's interests.

Registering concern over the visit's possible effects on Soviet interests, the article suggests that if the talks in Peking assume an anti-Soviet character they could adversely affect U.S.-Soviet negotiations on sensitive issues. Any attempt to drive a wedge between the USSR and the PRC or to step up "anti-Soviet intrigues," Arbatov warns, "would demonstrate extreme political shortsightedness." Taking note of the ongoing U.S.-Soviet "dialog on a broad range of problems," he emphasizes that "confidence is needed for their successful solution" and cautions that "there can be no stronger blow at confidence than unscrupulous diplomatic maneuvers, backstage

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intrigues, and ambiguities." As in the Aleksandrov article, Arbatov stops short of directly charging that the United States harbors these designs, attributing such suspicions about U.S. motives to "commentaries in the American press."

As if to challenge the President to live up to his statement that the visit to Peking will be a journey for peace and not detrimental to the interests of other countries, Arbatov insists that such statements can only be verified by deeds. In this context, he indicates that the United States can demonstrate its good faith on Vietnam, the Middle East, European security, limitation of the arms race, and U.S. relations with socialist countries. Here Arbatov makes a general plea for U.S.-Soviet detente on the basis of mutual interests: If American policy combines the steps towards improving Sino-U.S. relations with a turn toward a more constructive position on these major East-West issues, he says, "then in this case grounds will appear to take the statements about Washington's peace-loving intentions and good will seriously. There is no doubt that such a turn would be positively assessed in the Soviet Union." Such a development, he argues further, "would be in the interests of the USSR, the PRC, and the United States; and so far as the Soviet Union's policy is concerned, the road is open."

Concluding on a note of open-mindedness tinged with skepticism, Arbatov says there are "many grounds" for suspecting that U.S. policy will not move in this direction and cautions that in such circumstances "events will suggest appropriate conclusions, and these undoubtedly will be made . . . , for this is a matter of grave consequence for the Soviet people and for socialism."

Taken as a whole, the Soviet response highlighted by the Aleksandrov and Arbatov articles suggests a careful effort to avoid an overreaction that would jeopardize Brezhnev's foreign policy program as outlined at the 24th CPSU Congress. While airing misgivings over recent Sino-U.S. developments, making extensive use of the proxy of foreign comment, Moscow has sought to avoid an impression that its policy lines have been seriously disrupted and has indicated an intent to wait and see what direction a further Sino-U.S. detente may take before altering the basic lines of its own policy. Moscow's approach thus serves not only to warn its partners in the triangular relationship against prejudicing Soviet interests, but also to forestall any pressures from hardline elements at home to move toward a tougher position.

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## CHINA AND DPRK

## KIM IL-SONG ENDORSES NIXON TRIP TO PEKING AS VICTORY FOR PRC

Prince Sihanouk's visit to North Korea occasioned Pyongyang's first comment on President Nixon's projected visit to the PRC, an endorsement of Peking's demarche by Kim Il-song in a speech at a 6 August rally for Sihanouk. The latter, in his 24th "message to the Khmer nation" on 30 July, had made the first move in explaining that the invitation to the President did not mean any wavering of Peking's support for its allies. KCNA transmitted Sihanouk's message on 31 July. The sequence of events suggests that Sihanouk's mission may have been designed at least in part to convey Peking's reassurances and to put on a show of solidarity. Peking disseminated the text of Sihanouk's message and of Kim's speech, in the process carrying PRC media's only mentions of the invitation to the President since the original announcement. Li Hsien-nien, speaking at a banquet for a visiting DPRK economic delegation on 9 August, applauded Kim for having delivered an "important speech" on the 6th in which he made "a penetrating analysis of the current international situation." Li vowed that the Chinese "will always unite" with the Korean, Indochinese, and other Asian people to oppose U.S. and Japanese "schemes of aggression."

Peking had used a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 3 August pegged to Sihanouk's message to reassure its allies of continuing support despite developments in Sino-U.S. relations. The Commentator article, while carefully skirting the subject of the invitation to President Nixon, expressed support for Sihanouk's claim that the Indochina question can be solved only by the Indochinese people themselves and for his denunciation of an alleged U.S. "plot" to convene a new Geneva conference.

Until it disseminated Sihanouk's message, Pyongyang had remained silent about the President's projected visit but, unlike Hanoi, refrained from comment implicitly critical of the move. Like Hanoi, Pyongyang never reported the April visit of the American table tennis team to the PRC. Kim's endorsement of President Nixon's visit, seconded in a NODONG SINMUN editorial on 8 August, hailed the event as "a great victory" of the Chinese people and of the world

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revolutionary forces, implicitly including the North Koreans. Kim sought to portray the visit in tough anti-U.S. terms, claiming that the President is going to Peking--as the United States went to Panmunjom--"with a white flag" and that the visit will be not a "march of a victor" but a "trip of the defeated." According to Kim, the projected visit shows that Washington's "hostile policy" toward the PRC for more than 20 years has become bankrupt and that the United States has succumbed to the pressure of the world revolutionary forces. Expressing support for Peking's diplomatic drive, both Kim and the editorial perceived an "irresistible trend" in the world today to recognize the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China and to establish diplomatic relations with it.

The NODONG SINMUN editorial is notable for addressing itself to issues raised in the international communist movement over the invitation to President Nixon. In effect answering criticism from Moscow and other communist capitals, the editorial advanced an analogy between the Soviet Union's success in emerging from isolation and Peking's current drive. Describing the establishment of Soviet-U.S. diplomatic relations as a victory for Soviet foreign policy "pursued by Lenin and Stalin" and a "surrender" by the United States, the paper pointedly added: "The Soviet people won then, and the Chinese people are winning now." The editorial was carried in full by NCNA.

Kim may have been alluding to the misgivings expressed by Moscow--and perhaps responding to Hanoi's disquiet--when he noted in his speech that the invitation to the President "has aroused a wide variety of public opinion in the world today," but he did not elaborate. (He made a remark more pointedly critical of the Soviets in another context when he said it was natural that those countries which "truly support the national liberation struggle" should recognize Sihanouk's government and reject the "Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique," an allusion to Moscow's failure to recognize Sihanouk's RGNU and its maintenance of its embassy in Phnom Penh).

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Both Kim and the editorial stressed that Peking remains a "reliable pillar" of Asian revolutionary forces and faithful to "proletarian internationalism" in supporting people fighting U.S. imperialism. Kim suggested that official assurances have been made, noting that the PRC Government "makes it clear" that Peking will "continue to actively support and encourage the fighting revolutionary people." Both Kim and the editorial recalled that the recent celebrations of the 10th anniversary of the PRC-DPRK mutual defense treaty--which were taking place during the Kissinger mission to Peking--attested to the solidarity of the two countries.

While endorsing the invitation to President Nixon, Pyongyang at the same time has put the projected visit in the perspective of hardline anti-U.S. interests. Kim declared that the situation makes it incumbent on the revolutionary forces "to unite more closely and mount a more violent attack on the imperialists," warning that the enemy will become more vicious during a period of apparent detente.

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## KOREA

### DPRK, PRC PRESENT DEMAND FOR U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH KOREA

A seven-point demand for U.S. withdrawal from South Korea was put forward on 29 July by the North Korean representative at a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), speaking, according to Peking, for "the Korean-Chinese side." The meeting was the second to be held since the PRC's senior MAC representative returned to his post after a five-year absence. The Chinese presumably participated in the formulation of the seven-point demand, which has drawn authoritative backing in a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article. Pyongyang, after giving the MAC meeting routine coverage, reported the PEOPLE'S DAILY article but so far has not commented on its own.

The first six points of the presentation contained no surprises, but the seventh was a new call for the United States to "stop preventing people of North and South Korea from traveling in their own land, in their own country across the military demarcation line." The other points routinely called on the United States to get out of South Korea, stop bringing in "Japanese militarists," remove its weapons and military equipment from South Korea, end provocations and "aggressive acts" against the DPRK, remove illegal heavy weapons and military personnel from the demilitarized zone (DMZ), and insure security and order in the joint security area of Panmunjom.

The presentation of these demands may have been interded as a formal elaboration in the MAC forum of the first point of the DPRK's eight-point program on peaceful unification, calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea as a "prerequisite" for unification. It may also presage a campaign to reopen negotiations on the Korean question. The presentation at the MAC meeting did not, however, mention the eight-point program. That program, put forward by Foreign Minister Ho Tam at the Supreme People's Assembly last April, broke no new ground but served to codify the North Korean position on unification and has been repeatedly cited in subsequent propaganda.

The timing of the presentation of the new package may have been related to the 27 July anniversary of the signing of the armistice agreement. The North Korean MAC representative repeatedly pointed out in his statement that U.S. activities

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violate the agreement and called upon the Americans to observe its provisions. A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the armistice anniversary, which recalled the role of negotiations in the "tit-for-tat struggle" leading to the armistice, quoted Kim Il-song as pointing out the signing of the armistice agreement was but a first step to a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

**NORTH-SOUTH CONTACTS** The new point demanding that the Korean people be allowed to cross the military demarcation line is consistent with the stock North Korean position favoring various kinds of contacts between the people of North and South Korea as first steps toward unification. It may be responsive to the proposal by the UN side at a 12 June MAC meeting that negotiations be held on peaceful civilian use of the DMZ. The North Korean representative at the 29 July meeting recalled derisively that the United States had put forth a "'proposal' to use the DMZ for 'civilians' livelihood." Pyongyang had shown considerable sensitivity over this proposal, denouncing it in a 16 June DPRK Foreign Ministry statement as well as in a NODONG SINMUN article on 14 June. The foreign ministry statement called the proposal a "political trick and propaganda" and charged that the U.S. side was the one which had fortified the zone in the first place. It claimed that the problem would automatically be resolved if the United States stopped violating the armistice agreement.

The seventh point seems aimed at growing sentiment in South Korea for North-South contacts and may be intended to anticipate ROK President Pak's forthcoming National Day Address on 15 August, an occasion on which he customarily reviews the ROK position on unification. An attempt to play on the growing desire for contacts also seemed reflected in a major 6 August speech by Kim Il-song which included an unprecedented offer of readiness to make contacts regarding unification at any time with "all political parties including the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) of South Korea, public organizations, and individual personages." In the past, as in the eight-point program on unification, Pyongyang had not gone beyond a vague proposal for a consultative meeting of "all" political parties and public organizations of the North and South to negotiate steps toward unification, and that proposal was qualified by an expression of North Korean willingness to talk only with "patriotic-minded new figures" who would come to power after the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the ouster of "traitor" Pak Chong-hui.

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While holding out the prospect of contacts with the DRP, Pak's party, Kim avoided criticizing him by name. However, Pak was once again attacked in an 11 August letter concerning reunification sent by the Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland on behalf of Kim Il-song in reply to a message from Ko Pyong-chol, President of the United Front for Korean Democracy in New York. The letter agreed to a proposal by Ko to convene a "conference of overseas Korean compatriots for reunification" in a third country, the time and venue to be decided upon later. The committee's message repeated Pyongyang's standard line that a dialogue should be opened among "all" political parties, public organizations, and "patriotic personages" but added that since the Pak "clique" opposes any contact or travel between North and South, the venue for the dialogue must be a third country. It also reiterated that "we cannot discuss at all the question of the country's reunification with the traitorous Pak Chong-hui clique."

**PRC SUPPORT** PRC media carried the KCNA report on the meeting in full. Peking has normally carried only brief reports on the MAC meetings or ignored them altogether; the previous two meetings, including the first one after the return of the Chinese representative, were not reported by NCNA.

Authoritative Chinese endorsement of the seven-point demand has been expressed both in the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, on 3 August, and in a speech by Li Hsien-nien on the 9th welcoming a DPRK economic delegation in Peking. Chinese propaganda says that the DPRK delegate at the MAC meeting represented the "Korean-Chinese side"--a formulation Peking has not used since December 1966--while Pyongyang's reports, in the customary manner, merely referred to "our side."

While expressing support for the North Korean demands and rebuking the United States for rejecting them and again revealing itself as the "ferocious" enemy of the Korean people, Peking has characteristically stopped short of fully associating itself with Pyongyang's strongest denunciations of the United States. The PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator charged that the United States wants to perpetuate its "occupation" of South Korea and obstruct peaceful unification of the country, adding briefly that the United States carries out ceaseless "military provocations and sabotage" against the DPRK and is turning the DMZ into a "springboard for launching a new war." But again, as it had done on the occasion of the anniversary of the Sino-Korean treaty

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of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance,\* Peking failed to echo Pyongyang's most belligerent anti-American charges. PEOPLE'S DAILY did not, as the North Korean MAC representative did in his statement, elaborate on the history of alleged U.S. aggression or recall such incidents as the Pueblo, the downing of the EC-121 reconnaissance plane, and overflights by SR-71 reconnaissance planes.

In his 9 August speech Li Hsien-nien once again expressed Peking's support for the DPRK's aspiration for "peaceful unification," praising both the eight-point program on unification and the "seven-point strong demand" presented at the MAC meeting. He referred briefly to Kim Il-song's 6 August "penetrating analysis of the current international situation," but he did not elaborate on the Korean unification question.

\* See the TRENDS Supplement of 23 July 1971, "Tenth Anniversaries of North Korean Treaties with USSR, PRC."

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## NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

### PRC REJECTS SOVIET PROPOSAL, REPEATS CALL FOR WORLD SUMMIT

Peking waited until 7 August to publicize the text of the 30 July PRC Government statement rejecting the USSR's proposal for a conference of the five nuclear powers to discuss nuclear disarmament. Until the release of the statement PRC media had been totally silent on the 15 June Soviet proposal, first publicized by Moscow on the 22d of that month, although as early as 21 June Chou En-lai had indicated "personal reservations" about the proposal in remarks to Western newsmen. NCNA transmitted the text of the Soviet proposal in Chinese minutes after the release of the PRC statement, but it has not been carried in NCNA's English transmissions or by Radio Peking.

The PRC statement presses the stock Chinese position that all the nations of the world should participate in talks on nuclear disarmament, arguing that "a few nuclear countries have no right to brush aside the majority of countries in the world and arbitrarily hold a conference to consider and decide upon" such matters. Reviewing disarmament measures from the 1963 partial nuclear-test-ban treaty to the strategic arms limitation talks, it observes that none has in any way restricted the nuclear-arms race between the United States and the USSR. The peoples of the world, according to the statement, have lost confidence in disarmament talks between the nuclear powers, and they rightly hold that it is impossible to settle the question of nuclear disarmament by depending upon two "nuclear superpowers" or by adding more nuclear powers to the talks.

Peking has long excluded itself from the ranks of the "superpowers," and the statement takes the occasion to assert that the PRC--whose weapons are still in the "experimental" stage--will never be "a 'nuclear superpower' practicing the policies of nuclear monopoly, nuclear threats, and nuclear blackmail." It insists that China develops nuclear weapons purely for defensive purposes in the face of "imperialist nuclear threats."

The statement repeats the long-standing Chinese proposal--revived in PRC media after the Soviet Union advanced its five-power conference bid--for a summit conference of all countries of the world to discuss the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and, as a first step, to reach an agreement on

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non-use of nuclear weapons. It also reaffirms the Chinese pledge to seek the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and the PRC's commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

On the non-first-use question, the statement goes on to challenge the United States and the USSR, which "possess large quantities of nuclear weapons," to issue statements "separately or jointly to openly undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or in any circumstances," to dismantle all nuclear bases on the territories of other countries, and to withdraw all nuclear weapons from abroad. Such steps, the statement observes, would be a test of Washington's and Moscow's desire for nuclear disarmament. The challenge to the USSR is new; but in the wake of its first nuclear test in October 1964, Peking had suggested that the United States and the PRC issue statements pledging not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.\*

**MOSCOW'S REACTION** Having anticipated the negative Chinese response in a 30 July PRAVDA article, Moscow promptly reported the PRC's 7 August statement and has criticized it in broadcasts in Mandarin. A Radio Moscow commentary in Mandarin on the 9th rejected the arguments that a conference of the five nuclear powers would ignore the majority of the countries of the world and that the peoples of the world have lost confidence in disarmament talks among the nuclear powers. A Radio Peace and Progress commentary, also on the 9th, took note of "the thick fog of silence" which preceded the negative Peking response. Disputing the PRC's contention that discussion of nuclear disarmament can be conducted "only at a world conference attended by all countries," Radio Peace and Progress pointed out that such a conference would include representatives of the South African and Rhodesian "fascist regimes" and of the Saigon and Seoul "puppet regimes": The solution of mankind's most important problem would thus depend on "the good will of the politicians who . . . oppose all things progressive, create international tensions, and provoke military conflicts."

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\* For background see the FBIS SURVEY OF COMMUNIST RLOC PROPAGANDA, 7 January 1965, page 6.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## SUDAN: MOSCOW CURTAILS PROTESTS, BERATES PRC FOR "SILENCE"

Moscow's protest campaign against Sudanese "repression" of communists has markedly diminished, with continuing propaganda providing no indication of the formal status of Soviet-Sudanese relations and almost nothing in the way of reportage or comment on actual developments in Khartoum. Broadcast propaganda since the release of the second TASS statement on 31 July has consisted almost entirely of reportage on Soviet workers' statements and protest meetings and roundups of worldwide reaction, along with rebroadcasts of a 2 August foreign-language commentary by Glazunov deploring anticommunism. But foreign-language broadcasts have indicated some sensitivity to the PRC's attitude toward Sudan and Sudanese Chairman an-Numayri's overtures to Peking.

Moscow has still failed to acknowledge Khartoum's withdrawal of its ambassador from Moscow and its action in declaring the counselor of the Soviet embassy in Khartoum persona non grata. TASS on the 5th did report that the Bulgarian embassy had again denied assertions of Bulgarian intervention in Sudanese domestic affairs and had protested the expulsion of the Bulgarian ambassador.

The only Soviet expression of continued "displeasure" over "new manifestations of hostility" toward the Soviet Union came in a 9 August broadcast which claimed that imperialist propaganda methods, such as "the charge of so-called 'Soviet imperialism,'" were employed in these "crude attacks." But after routinely assailing Israeli-imperialist efforts to sabotage Soviet-Arab cooperation, the commentary launched into a defense of the "principled character" of Soviet policy and aid, asserting that the present Sudanese leaders themselves had more than once referred to this characteristic. Remarking that the anti-Soviet campaign in Sudan had aroused serious concern in the Arab world, the commentary recalled a statement by UAR President as-Sadat "not long ago" of the permanence of Egypt's friendship with the USSR and added that "other Arab leaders" had similarly assessed Soviet-Arab relations.

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BELYAYEV      Recounting the events in the week of the coup and  
COMMENT      counter-coup, panelist Belyayev, on the domestic  
             service commentators' roundtable on the 8th,  
suggested lingering approval of the 19 July action. The "new  
authorities," he remarked, had announced their program to the  
people and said they would follow "democratic standards of  
government." While avoiding any explicit criticism of  
an-Numayri, Belyayev said that after an-Numayri's radio  
announcement that he was back in power there followed the  
assertion, "completely out of the blue," that the 19 July  
coup was the work of the Communist Party, and then came the  
arrests and mass repressions that "upset the entire world."  
Belyayev concluded that "someone" from among the "extremely  
reactionary rightwing elements" tried to exploit the  
22 July counter-coup to repress progressive and democratic  
elements. This "outburst of nationalistic feelings," in  
Belyayev's assessment, led to anticommunism and Sudanese  
press attacks on the USSR, a development serving neither  
the cause of the revolution in Sudan nor the cause of the  
Arab national liberation movement and the struggle against  
Israel.

PRC-SUDAN      Soviet reportage on Khartoum developments is  
RELATIONS      confined to brief reports relating to PRC-  
             Sudanese relations. Thus TASS on the 5th  
noted that an-Numayri had received the PRC ambassador and  
handed him a message to Mao and Chou, and conveyed gratitude  
for China's position on the 19 July coup. And on the 9th  
TASS reported an-Numayri as telling a Western correspondent  
that Sudan's relations with China and the United States would  
improve as a result of the 22 July counter-coup, and calling  
PRC-Sudanese relations "remarkable." A broadcast in Mandarin  
on the 6th had cited Khartoum papers as saying an-Numayri had  
decided to send a high-ranking delegation to China to further  
strengthen and develop relations.

A commentary in Arabic on the 6th took Peking to task for its  
"inappropriate attitude" in maintaining silence about the  
"bloody terrorism" in Sudan and "even welcoming" those whose  
hands were stained with blood. As in other foreign-language  
broadcasts, the commentary cited the Italian CP organ  
L'UNITA's charge that maintaining silence in these  
circumstances was tantamount to "a manifestation of not  
only a dangerous insensitivity but also indifference to the  
most important question of the anti-imperialist struggle."

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And the broadcast, in line with past Soviet criticism of Peking vis-a-vis the Middle East, accused the PRC of doing "nothing tangible" to help the Arabs but rather of joining Zionist and Western imperialist quarters in efforts to undermine Arab-Soviet cooperation, acting in its own selfish interests. Broadcasts in Mandarin have also called attention to Peking's silence on Sudan.

### USSR SPECULATES ON REPORTED ISRAELI-CHINESE CONTACTS

Along with criticism of the PRC for its attitude on Sudan, Moscow takes some cautious swipes at the Chinese in connection with Israeli reports, beginning on 26 July, of contacts in Paris between Chinese diplomats and a representative of the Israeli leftwing party Mapam, which belongs to the government coalition. TASS on 3 August and an Arabic-language broadcast on the 4th picked up London and Beirut press reports on the contacts; comment is thus far confined to the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress and to circuitous publication in the Czechoslovak press of a Demchenko commentary released by NOVOSTI. This indirect approach might stem from reluctance to engage in outright attacks on Peking for dealings with the Israelis, a charge which the Chinese could hurl back at Moscow. The Soviets have failed to acknowledge Israeli press speculation on Soviet-Israeli contacts over the past two months, including journalist Victor Louis' June visit to Israel, and have taken no public note of Israel's position--stated by Foreign Minister Eban in the Knesset on 14 July--that it is prepared to discuss resumption of Soviet-Israeli relations.

A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast to Africa on the 5th, citing the reported contacts, concluded that Peking was joining forces with "the most reactionary" anti-African and anti-Arab forces, conducting a policy which benefited only imperialism. A Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin on the 7th depicted Tel Aviv as seeking a change in China's attitude toward Israel in light of the Chinese leaders' "vociferous anti-Sovietism," which has drawn the Peking leaders into the camp of the imperialists and reactionaries, and speculated that such a Chinese trend had emerged from the informal contacts.

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The Demchenko commentary, published in Bratislava PRAVDA on 5 August, remarked that the Chinese press was still discreetly quiet about the reported Paris contacts, although the Israeli papers were openly discussing them, with the Jerusalem POST speaking of the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations. Demchenko speculated whether the main issue in the contacts was a political sounding of the situation or "a secret agreement which has already made great progress." It could not be excluded, he said, that Peking could make a 180-degree turn, for the sake of "narrow nationalist interests," and betray those whom it recently assured of its support and eternal friendship. Demchenko here recalled Peking's declarations that it would always support the Palestine liberation movement, asserting that during the recent events in Jordan the Chinese leadership "cooled very palpably toward the Palestine movement" and forgot its promises.\* Now, he added, Peking has started a flirtation with the "Israeli aggressor," and he noted that reports on the Israeli-PRC contacts appeared immediately after agreement on President Nixon's trip to Peking had been reached.

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\* Along with customary NCNA coverage of the Jordanian authorities' "suppression" of the Palestine guerrillas, a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 23 July had expressed the Chinese people's "indignant condemnation" of this "new bloody crime" and firm support of the Palestinian guerrillas' "just action of counterattack."

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## INDIA

## SOVIET UNION, INDIA SIGN TREATY DURING GROMYKO VISIT

At a time of acute Indian-Pakistani tensions against a background of great-power rivalry in South Asia, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 8 August made a hurried trip--announced only three days earlier--to New Delhi where on the next day he signed a 20-year Soviet-Indian treaty of "peace, friendship, and cooperation." While Moscow has depicted the event as a natural fruit of a long growth of bilateral bonds, the signing of the pact marked a major turn from Moscow's four-month-long tightrope walk on the East Pakistan question and a departure from India's long-standing line of neutrality in international affairs. Where previously Moscow had sought to project an image of the deeply concerned honest broker in the tradition of the January 1966 Tashkent mediation, the sharpening threat of hostilities evidently prompted the Soviets to formalize their close ties with India in order to strengthen their influence at a crucial juncture.

The treaty will enter in force upon the exchange of the instruments of ratification in Moscow "within one month." TASS reported on the 10th that both the USSR Council of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet Presidium had already approved the treaty and that it had been submitted for endorsement to the foreign affairs commissions of the two houses of the Supreme Soviet. When it comes into force the treaty will take its place behind the USSR-UAR treaty of "friendship and cooperation" of 27 May 1971 as only the second friendship treaty between the Soviet Union and a noncommunist, noncontiguous country. The Soviet-FRG treaty signed on 12 August 1970--which Soviet media refer to simply as "the treaty" without further characterization--is still pending ratification.

The Soviet Union has treaties of "friendship and good-neighbor relations" with Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey which date back to 1921, and a treaty of "friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance"--the same designation as the bilateral treaties with the Soviet bloc countries--with Finland, signed on 6 April 1948 and extended on 20 July 1970 for an additional 20 years.

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The Soviet-Indian treaty covers a range of bilateral concerns and takes note of a number of international issues, reflecting give and take on some points and convergence of views on others. In large measure the treaty is fashioned along the same lines as the Soviet-UAR treaty--Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, and 11 of the treaty with India have, with minor differences, comparable passages in the earlier treaty and both consist of 12 articles. There are also significant variations reflecting the different situations in the Middle East and in South Asia and the differing nature of Soviet relations with the two countries. The only direct comparison noted in Soviet media between the two treaties was made by Radio Moscow observer Yuriy Soltan on the 9th when he said that both treaties were "concrete examples" of the 24th CPSU Congress' emphasis on "the importance of strengthening cooperation with the developing countries." The connection is also implicitly pointed up by a 10 August Cairo-dated TASS dispatch--the only reaction cited by Moscow apart from Soviet and Indian sources--quoting a Cairo newspaper's assessment of the Soviet-Indian treaty as going "far beyond the framework of the relations between the two countries" and constituting "a stabilizing factor in the cause of preserving peace and security on the Asiatic continent."

#### PARTIES PLEDGE "APPROPRIATE EFFECTIVE MEASURES" TO INSURE PEACE

While Moscow is pressing the line that the Soviet-Indian treaty represents a natural development in a long history of Soviet-Indian relations rather than a response to transitory events, the substance of the treaty is clearly designed for the current Indian-Pakistani confrontation, with the specter of China looming in the background as Pakistan's patron. Soviet comment, however, has not made a point of stressing the provisions relevant to hostilities. These provisions are contained in Articles 8 and 9, which provide for a mutual non-aggression agreement and pledge the sides to take "appropriate effective measures" in case of hostilities without committing them to military assistance. The treaty is not strictly a mutual defense pact, such as the Soviet Union has with its communist allies, and it falls short of the Soviet-Finnish treaty in its degree of Soviet commitment in case of attack. In the treaty with Finland the Soviets are committed to "extend to Finland any necessary assistance." In the mutual defense treaties with its communist allies, Moscow is pledged to provide "every assistance," specifically including military aid.

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While comparable in many respects to the Soviet-UAR treaty, the one with India is more specifically oriented to the danger of an outbreak of hostilities. A sense of this danger is reflected in the addition of the term "peace" in the title of the treaty with India and in wording more tailored to military contingencies. Thus, the Soviet-Indian treaty provides that the two parties renounce participation in "any military alliances" directed against the other and refrain from giving any assistance to any third party taking part in "an armed conflict" with one of the two sides. The comparable passages in the Soviet-UAR treaty make no direct reference to armed conflict and provide that the two parties "will not enter into alliances and will not take part in any groupings of states" directed against the other.

More important in this respect is the provision of the Soviet-Indian treaty that in case either party "is attacked or threatened with attack" the two countries will "immediately start mutual consultations with a view to eliminating this threat and taking appropriate effective measures to insure peace and security for their countries." The more vaguely worded comparable passage in the Soviet-UAR treaty, omitting any reference to military activities, provides that "in the event of development of situations" which "in the opinion of both sides" constitute a "danger to peace or violation of peace," both parties "will contact each other without delay in order to concert their positions with a view to removing the threat that has arisen or reestablishing peace."

The Soviet-Indian treaty does not contain a provision on continuing routine military assistance such as that included in the Soviet-UAR treaty, which provides for cooperation in military training and the supply of equipment to the UAR armed forces.

#### MOSCOW PORTRAYS PACT AS NATURAL STEP, STABILIZING FACTOR

Anticipating the charge that the treaty is aimed at Pakistan and indirectly at China,\* Moscow has been at pains to portray

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\* Just such a charge was immediately made by Tirana on the 9th. Contending that the Soviet Union and India were "directing the edge of their joint activity against their neighbors," a Tirana broadcast quoted AFP for the observation that the treaty "is actually a military agreement directed against China and Pakistan."

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the pact as the natural culmination of many years of warm Soviet-Indian relations and as a stabilizing force in Asia. Soviet comment on the treaty has touched on all of its substantive points without placing particular stress on any one. The same general pattern was followed in Soviet propaganda on the treaty with the UAR.

Gromyko, in a speech at the signing ceremony summarized by TASS on the 9th, characterized the treaty as one of those "significant events that ripened through decades and that was prepared by the entire previous development" of Soviet-Indian relations. He termed it "an important landmark" that "crowns a principled and consistent line of our countries for cooperation and friendship," adding that "it is hard to overestimate the importance of this treaty." Citing Nehru and Lenin as the founders of the respective countries' foreign policy courses, Gromyko declared that "we have been together in all times, good and bad" and explained that "lying at the bedrock of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and India are not some transitory factors but lasting vital interests of our peoples and states and their concern in the preservation of peace." Similarly, PRAVDA on the 11th contended that the treaty was founded not on "transitory motives" but on "the deep-rooted vital interests of both states." This line was echoed by commentator Soltan, in a broadcast beamed to both domestic and foreign audiences on the 9th and 10th. He asserted that the treaty was "a natural result" of Soviet-Indian relations which "are based not on transitory factors, but on a community of aims in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism, on vital, long-term interests and a constant desire to strengthen peace."

While stressing that the treaty is not directed against any particular third party, Soviet media have raised the issue of Indian-Pakistani relations in the context of the Soviet-Indian treaty. The 9 August TASS report of the signing ceremony cited Indian Foreign Minister Singh's contention that the treaty was "an important stabilizing factor in the area"; it further noted his observations that Gromyko's visit to India "coincides with the developments in this part of the world" and that the visit "is evidence of our common resolve to defend peace and avert war." PRAVDA said that Soviet-Indian relations--meaning the treaty--"are producing a favorable influence on the settlement of urgent international problems--including acute problems in Asia." Citing the mutual consultation commitment in the event of an attack or a threat of attack, PRAVDA immediately added that "the treaty is not directed against any third party."

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A more pointed reference to tensions in South Asia was contained in a Moscow radio broadcast in English to the area on the 10th. Citing the provision on mutual consultation and appropriate measures in case of attack or threat of attack, the commentary asserted that "this provision knocks the ground from under the feet of those aggressive elements who would like to capitalize on the complicated situation in Asia to spread the flames of war to still vaster areas of the continent."

A TASS report on Prime Minister Gandhi's speech to a Congress party rally on the 9th noted that she "pointed to difficulties brought about by the influx of East Pakistan refugees into India." TASS did not mention her remarks about the possibility of recognizing Bangla Desh--a possibility that presumably was a key factor in the timing of Gromyko's mission.

In another reference to the East Pakistan problem, TASS on 9 August--during a period when the agency was transmitting several items on the treaty--carried a Rawalpindi-dated dispatch announcing that Awami League leader Mujibur Rahman would stand trial in a special military court "on charges of 'launching military activities' in Pakistan." TASS added, without further comment, that "the Awami League, led by Mujibur Rahman, has secured at the elections to the national assembly of the country 160 seats out of a total 162 East Pakistan was given in this constituent assembly."

#### BACKGROUND ON SOVIET TREATMENT OF INDIAN-PAKISTANI TENSION

The Soviet line on the crisis in Indian-Pakistan relations sparked by the onset of civil war in East Pakistan on 26 March has taken a number of turns.\* After initial fence-straddling on the Pakistan domestic crisis, Moscow took an official position in a 3 April message from President Podgorny to President Yahya Khan expressing Soviet concern over the "continuation of repressive measures and bloodshed" in East Pakistan and appealing to Yahya for "a peaceful political settlement." By mid-April Moscow had pulled back to a less visible stance, seeking to appear as a nonpartisan peacemaker. Soviet media's sparse reportage balanced Western news reports of "fierce" battles with official Pakistani Government claims

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\* For the evolution of the Soviet and Chinese lines see the TRENDS of 7 April, pages 24-27; 14 April, pages 30-33; and 28 April, pages 26-28.

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that the situation in East Pakistan had "fully returned to normal." By late April, reflecting an apparent judgment that the rebellion was winding down and that Soviet interests lay in good relations with the Pakistan Government, Moscow limited its coverage to official Pakistani sources portraying a return to normalcy and a complete rout of the secessionist forces in East Pakistan.

During May and June Moscow's infrequent references to the East Pakistan situation highlighted the plight of the Pakistan refugees and Soviet assistance to India's massive efforts to care for them. A Soviet-Indian communique, carried by PRAVDA on 9 June at the end of Indian Foreign Minister Singh's visit to Moscow, stressed concern over the refugee problem, expressed Indian gratitude for Moscow's "frank and clear understanding of the gravity of this situation," and underscored a need for "immediate measures to be taken in East Pakistan to insure the cessation of the stream of refugees from East Pakistan" and for the "restoration of peace" to enable the return of the refugees. Speaking at an election meeting on 9 June, Kosygin took note of the "increased tension" between India and Pakistan and called on the Pakistan Government to undertake immediate measures leading to "the creation of conditions for the return of the refugees to their homes."

Going even further and enunciating a line which Moscow later adopted, a joint GDR-Indian statement at the end of a visit to East Germany by an Indian minister, carried by TASS on 24 June, declared that the end of the flight and the return of the refugees is possible "only if a solution is found to the basic political problem in accordance with the will of the people of East Pakistan and in consultation with their elected representatives."

Since early July Soviet media have continued to highlight refugee problems while increasingly portraying heightened military tensions between India and Pakistan, particularly in border areas. One device utilized is a single TASS dispatch juxtaposing reports from Delhi and Karachi containing charges that the other party initiated a military attack or denials that such an attack occurred. IZVESTIYA on 10 July expressed the hope that "even at the present tense moment it will be possible to avoid a situation which could lead to the further complication of relations between India and Pakistan."

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Moscow's increasing concern over the possibility of an outbreak of hostilities was indicated in TASS reports on the 1st and 2d of August. Citing foreign news sources, TASS reported that four Pakistani divisions were deployed near the East Pakistani border with India and quoted President Yahya as saying that "Pakistan is very close to a war against India." This was juxtaposed to a Delhi report that Pakistani authorities were evacuating the civilian population from areas along the border and that there had been a "growth in the number of armed incidents" along the border. The next day TASS reported Singh's warning to Pakistan "against the use of any pretext to unleash a war with India," promising "a worthy rebuff" to any such attack.

That Moscow had decided to commit itself to India was reflected in the 8 August TASS report on Gromyko's arrival in India, which cited the Delhi newspapers as stressing "the identity of stands of India and the Soviet Union on the main problems of today." A commentator on Moscow's domestic service roundtable program on the same day declared that "to let matters come to a clash between Pakistan and India . . . is in effect saying that in the very near future we shall have yet another hotbed of international tension." He added that "world public opinion should not allow that. India and Pakistan can and should live in peace."

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## SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS

## MOSCOW AND ALLIES PUBLICIZE NEW ECONOMIC INTEGRATION PROGRAM

The text of the long-range economic integration program adopted at the 25th CEMA Council session in Bucharest on 27-29 July, published on the 7th in PRAVDA and the other member countries' major papers, largely confirms indications in the session's communique and surrounding comment that the document amounts to a formalization of existing practices in CEMA, with future goals sufficiently general and long-range to allow the member countries considerable freedom of maneuver. On another level, however, the emphasis in the comment from Moscow and its hard-core allies on the document's embodiment of "socialist internationalism" and of political and military as well as economic unity further underscores Moscow's intent to use Romania's endorsement of the CEMA program as a lever to exert pressure for greater conformity.

A joint meeting of the CPSU Politburo and the USSR Council of Ministers--customary following CEMA Council sessions--was held on the 9th to examine the report of the Soviet delegation on the results of the CEMA session and approve the delegation's activity. TASS reported that the party and government regarded the "unanimously" adopted integration program as a document "of great political importance," whose implementation will strengthen the CEMA countries' "economic and defense potential" as well as the "further unity and cohesion of the socialist community."

Hungary, continuing to spearhead the Soviet bloc polemics against Romania's freewheeling behavior, held a party-government meeting on the CEMA session five days before the Soviets did, and MTI's report of the Hungarian meeting pointed up more sharply the theme of the Crimea gathering of Soviet bloc first secretaries--minus Ceausescu--in the wake of the CEMA session. The Hungarian party and government, MTI said, approved the work of that country's CEMA delegation and called for rejection of "any attempt aimed at disrupting" the unity and cooperation among members of CEMA, the Warsaw Pact, and the world socialist system.

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THE NEW PROGRAM      As forehadowed in the 29 July communique on the CEMA meeting, the integration program states at the outset that "socialist economic integration is taking place on the basis of true voluntariness, is not accompanied by the creation of supranational organs, and does not affect questions of internal planning or of organizations' financial and financially autonomous activity." The document thus puts into a perspective acceptable to the Romanians the key aspects of the long-range program relating to joint planning and the evolution of the long-discussed "transferable ruble" into a "collective currency" of the CEMA countries.

On the score of joint planning, the document says in low-keyed terms that "at the initial stage the CEMA countries will implement joint planning with respect to a small number of sectors and types of production processes and will gradually extend this planning in the future as -- experience is accumulated in the joint planning sphere." While providing for "contracts and agreements" to legalize plan coordination, it appears to envisage continued cooperation on the basis of "exchanges of experience" and "multilateral consultations," short of spelling out a future transition from national economic plans to a single integrated economic plan for the CEMA countries.

The program discourses at length on the setting up of "international economic organizations" by "interested" CEMA countries in the spheres of production, trade, scientific and technical cooperation, and so on. These organizations--presumably not viewed by the Romanians as conflicting with the program's ban on "supranational organizations"--are to be dealt with in a "multilateral agreement" among the CEMA countries in 1971-72.

In announcing the publication of the CEMA program in the next day's PRAVDA, TASS on the 6th said that "one of the main tasks" was developing "the over-all legal regime" for deepening cooperation and developing integration. At the same time, TASS reiterated that integration would be on the basis both of "socialist internationalism" and of respect for state sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, and "complete equality." It said that under the program the CEMA countries "will be perfecting coordination of national economic plans and will expand

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cooperation in planning, while combining this with widening use of commodity-money relations." TASS also noted that the program provides for cooperation in development of trade "with socialist countries that are not CEMA members and with other countries."

**FOLLOWUP COMMENT** PRAVDA's editorial on the 8th stressed that the integration program "is permeated with the spirit of socialist internationalism" and will strengthen the "economic and defensive might of the world socialist system." The editorial also underscored "the single ideology, Marxism-Leninism," of the CEMA member countries and cited the Crimea meeting and the CEMA session as "new major steps to strengthen political and economic unity and cohesion of the countries of socialism." A participant in the Moscow domestic service roundtable on the 8th emphasized the continuity inherent in the new integration program, based "primarily on the more than 20 years' experience of the cooperation of the CEMA member countries," but also defensively denounced as "either ignoramuses or liars" those "bourgeois commentators" who contend that there is "nothing unusual in the integration of CEMA countries."

The main lines of the Soviet comment were echoed by the GDR's CEMA representative in an ADN interview reported by TASS on the 10th. The new program, the East German delegate said, will strengthen the CEMA countries' defenses by enhancing their position in the world economy and will strengthen the socialist countries' unity in "the international class struggle." It is "a continuation of the cooperation cultivated and proven in the past," he added, "but on a higher level." An article in the Warsaw Catholic paper SLOWO POWSZECHNE on 9 August characterized the program as "a road between obsolete economic autarky, which stands no chance of survival in the contemporary world, and a supranational integration whose material progress is achieved at the expense of national sovereignty."

Bucharest duly published the text of the program in SCINTEIA on the 7th, having already expounded the Romanian interpretation of it in an authoritative article by I. Fintinaru on 1 August.

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**BELGRADE CHARGES, BUDAPEST DENIES PACT MANEUVERS POSE THREAT**

In commentaries on 4 and 7 August denouncing the 2-5 August "Opal 71" maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and rumored impending Pact exercises in Bulgaria, the Yugoslav press has expressed more than usual concern over threatening aspects of the maneuvers and has specifically given voice to concern in behalf of Romania, in the process underscoring Yugoslav-Romanian affinities. Indirectly responsive to such comment as well as to discussion of the maneuvers in the Western press, leading Hungarian papers on the 8th and 9th emphasized the "routine" nature of Opal 71 and decried speculation that the maneuvers were aimed at "neighbors."

**YUGOSLAV COMMENT** The Yugoslav comment went beyond routine reaction to Pact maneuvers, which has normally taken the form of generalized condemnations of exercises staged by both "military blocs," East and West, as a threat to peace and to Yugoslavia's own security. This time, in addition to the press comment delineating a wider threat specifically encompassing Romania, TANJUG atypically reproduced a full TASS report of the communique on Opal 71, including the statement that the participating Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian troops carried out "a joint advance on a river under war conditions." The Prut River forms a large part of the border between the USSR and Romania.

On 4 August, while the Opal 71 maneuvers were still in progress, a commentary in the Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJE noted Western news reports of "still officially unconfirmed" forthcoming exercises in Bulgaria involving three Soviet and two Bulgarian divisions. The article quoted the London TIMES to the effect that the exercises will thus take place in an area in which are located "independent Romania and nonaligned Yugoslavia; Bulgaria, the most loyal member of the socialist alliance; Albania, which is oriented toward China; and two NATO members, Greece and Turkey." It added that according to the Paris FIGARO, "the Soviet army has requested Bucharest to allow passage through Romanian territory."

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Condemning such "demonstrations of force," the article commented that "Romania and Albania, each for reasons of its own, probably share the feeling of unpleasantness caused by these maneuvers,"\* It added that "Romania continues to play an extremely favorable role," particularly in its efforts to have the Balkans declared a zone of peace, not to mention "the similar activities on the part of Yugoslavia." The commentary concluded ambivalently that while the reported maneuvers in Bulgaria "acquire an unpleasant taste, in the final analysis this is a matter which does not deserve special anxiety," as if to suggest that in practical terms they constitute nothing more alarming than pressure tactics.

A commentary by Teslic in the 7 August BORBA, the Belgrade daily most closely reflecting party policy, focused more sharply on Romania as the target of the Pact exercises, noting "world news agency reports" of "multilateral military maneuvers" currently underway or "about to begin in several Warsaw Pact countries on both sides of Romania." The commentary added that "such practice does not cause concern to Romania only" and "grossly insults and undermines the national independence and autonomy of every country in this region."

The BORBA commentator prefaced his attack on the maneuvers with praise for the Romanian representative's proposal at the Geneva disarmament conference two days earlier that the Balkans be transformed into a zone free of nuclear weapons and foreign bases. He emphasized in this connection "the position of Romania, whose membership in the Warsaw Pact does not present an obstacle to its broadly working at the same time against the logic and practice of military blocs, . . . threats, and restrictions of the national independence and sovereignty of each individual country." The article went on to stress that the Romanian Government has "specifically expressed itself against military maneuvers on territories of other countries, against the stationing of foreign bases and forces, as well as against the pressure" of military blocs.

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\* On 3 August a Tirana broadcast briefly attacked the Opal 71 maneuvers and those reportedly to take place in Bulgaria as "aggressive" exercises "being arranged within the framework of the policy of expansion and pressure pursued toward other countries by the Soviet social imperialists."

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HUNGARIAN COMMENT      Reminiscent of Soviet bloc propaganda surrounding the mid-1968 Pact maneuvers in Czechoslovakia, an article in the Budapest NEPSZABADSAG on 8 August scored "the contemptible intentions of Western military columnists" who had conjectured that if the planned Opal 71 exercises "did take place, they would be aimed 'against some neighbors of Hungary,' and if they were canceled it would be because those neighbors had protested." Stating that there were no such protests, the article asked blandly "Who could protest because of ordinary maneuvers on the territory of our sovereign socialist country?" In a similar vein, an article entitled "The Canard Exposed" in the government paper MAGYAR HIRLAP the next day denounced the rumor "from the West" to the effect that the armies involved in Opal 71 "planned a demonstration of military strength in Hungary toward the south and southeast"--unmistakably Yugoslavia and Romania, respectively. The maneuvers, it said, were "the normal annual routine test" of the troops' level of training and "did not represent any aggressive intentions against anyone."

In the same issue of MAGYAR HIRLAP the speech by Hungarian Deputy Defense Minister Olah at the parade ending Opal 71 echoed the current emphasis in Soviet propaganda on the roles played by CEMA and the Warsaw Pact in "unity" above and beyond the economic and military spheres. Maj. Gen. Olah declared that "in addition to the immediate military goals, these maneuvers also definitely serve political interests."

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## PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## SZECHWAN PROVINCIAL RADIO RESUMES LOCAL BROADCASTING

The provincial radio of Szechwan, China's largest province, has broken away from its solid relay of Radio Peking--sustained since 19 November 1969--to broadcast local news and commentary in the Szechwan dialect. The local broadcasts began on 3 August.

The content of these local programs, the first in nearly two years, has been of minor significance so far, with no intimation that establishment of a Szechwan provincial party committee is imminent. Most items have concerned the activities of local mines and factories. One broadcast, on the 6th, reported on a "recent" provincial conference "on grasping revolution and stimulating production in the capital construction field." It was said that Hsu Shih, a vice chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee, presided over the meeting; and reference was made to a decision of the CCP core group of the provincial revolutionary committee on learning from Taching.\* (The Szechwan party core group had not been mentioned in the occasional NCNA items on Szechwan at least since the beginning of this year.)

The last such "silent" provincial-level radio to resume local broadcasting, the Kweichow provincial service, did so on 18 May, the day after NCNA announced formation of the Kweichow Provincial CCP Committee. Among the initial items broadcast was a KWEICHOW DAILY editorial welcoming formation of the new party committee.

Inner Mongolia, which set up its regional party committee last May, is now the only provincial-level unit whose radio is still on solid relay of Radio Peking. The radio has originated no local political materials since 5 January 1970.

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\* A later local broadcast, on the 10th, reported that Chang Kuo-hua and Li Ta-chang spoke at a "recent" provincial symposium on learning from Tachai convened by the provincial revolutionary committee. Chang and Li, chairman and vice chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee, were identified only as "responsible persons of the CCP core group." They last appeared publicly on National Day 1970.

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